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Abstract
The recently proposed x-vector based anonymization
scheme converts any input voice into that of a random pseudo-
speaker. In this paper, we present a flexible pseudo-speaker
selection technique as a baseline for the first VoicePrivacy Chal-
lenge. We explore several design choices for the distance met-
ric between speakers, the region of x-vector space where the
pseudo-speaker is picked, and gender selection. To assess the
strength of anonymization achieved, we consider attackers us-
ing an x-vector based speaker verification system who may use
original or anonymized speech for enrollment, depending on
their knowledge of the anonymization scheme. The Equal Error
Rate (EER) achieved by the attackers and the decoding Word
Error Rate (WER) over anonymized data are reported as the
measures of privacy and utility. Experiments are performed us-
ing datasets derived from LibriSpeech to find the optimal com-
bination of design choices in terms of privacy and utility.
Index Terms: speaker anonymization, VoicePrivacy challenge,
voice conversion, PLDA, x-vectors
1. Introduction
Privacy protection methods for speech fall into four broad
categories [1]: deletion, encryption, distributed learning, and
anonymization. The VoicePrivacy initiative [1] specifically pro-
motes the development of anonymization methods which aim
to suppress personally identifiable information in speech while
leaving other attributes such as linguistic content intact.1 Recent
studies have proposed anonymization methods based on noise
addition [2], speech transformation [3], voice conversion [4–6],
speech synthesis [7, 8], and adversarial learning [9]. We focus
on voice conversion / speech synthesis based methods due to
the naturalness of their output and their promising results so far.
In order to implement a speaker anonymization scheme
based on voice conversion or speech synthesis, we must address
the following questions: 1. What is the best representation to
characterize speaker information in a speech signal? 2. Which
distance metric is most appropriate to explore various regions
of the speaker space? 3. How to optimally select target speakers
from a small pool of speakers? 4. How to combine the distance
metric and target selection in order to strike balance between
privacy protection and loss of utility?
Classically, speaker anonymization methods that rely on a
voice conversion or speech synthesis system select a random
target speaker from a pool of speakers which must be included
1In the legal community, the term “anonymization” means that this
goal has been achieved. Following the VoicePrivacy Challenge, we use
it to refer to the task to be addressed, even when the method has failed.
in the training set for that system. This constraint severely re-
stricts the user’s freedom to choose an arbitrary unseen speaker
as the target for anonymization. Moreover, several targets can-
not be mixed together to create an imaginary sample in speaker
space, i.e., a pseudo-speaker. In a previous experimental study
[10], we specified three criteria to be satisfied by voice conver-
sion algorithms for speaker anonymization: 1) non-parallel, 2)
many-to-many, and 3) source- and language-independent. Al-
though the algorithms compared in [10] satisfied these criteria,
they did not allow conversion conditioned over a continuous
speaker representation, such as x-vectors [11].
Recently, Fang et al. [8] proposed to identify x-vectors at a
fixed distance from the “user” x-vector and to combine them to
produce a pseudo-speaker representation. This representation,
along with the “user” linguistic representation, is provided as
input to a Neural Source-Filter (NSF) [12] based speech syn-
thesizer to produce anonymized speech. Han et al. [13] ex-
tended [8] by proposing a metric privacy framework where an x-
vector based pseudo-speaker is selected so as to satisfy a given
privacy budget. Based on these studies, we answer Question 1
by choosing x-vectors as the appropriate speaker representation.
In addition, the freedom to generate previously unseen pseudo-
speakers by combining existing speakers from a small dataset
exponentially increases the choices for the user.
The user may select pseudo-speakers at random in the entire
x-vector space or based on specific properties, such as density
of speakers, gender majority, etc. They must also choose a simi-
larity metric between x-vectors since this dictates the properties
of the vector space. Previous studies [14] have shown that Prob-
abilistic Linear Discriminant Analysis (PLDA) yields state-of-
the-art speaker verification performance, superior to the cosine
distance. This is attributed to the formulation of PLDA which
estimates the factorized within-speaker and between-speaker
variability in speaker space. Hence, the PLDA score provides a
good estimate of the log-likelihood ratio between same-speaker
and different-speaker hypotheses, making it a superior measure
of speaker affinity even for short speech segments [15].
In this paper, we establish that a greater level of anonymiza-
tion is achieved when the distance between x-vectors is mea-
sured by PLDA instead of the cosine distance as used by Fang
et al. [8] (answering Question 2). Then, we introduce a de-
sign choice called proximity which allows us to pick the pseudo-
speaker in dense, sparse, far, or near regions of speaker space.
We further explore the flexibility of this anonymization scheme
by exploring the influence of gender selection. These design
choices are evaluated using attackers which may or may not
know the anonymization scheme applied (answering Question
3). Finally we suggest the optimal combination of distance
metric and design choices based on qualitative and quantitative
measures to balance privacy and utility (answering Question 4).
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We describe the general anonymization framework and the
proposed design choices in Section 2. The datasets and eval-
uations metrics are briefly explained in Section 3. We present
the experiments and discuss their results in Section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Anonymization design choices
The general anonymization scheme follows the method pro-
posed in [16] and shown in Fig. 1. It comprises three steps: Step
1 (Feature extraction) extracts fundamental frequency (F0) and
bottleneck (BN) features and the source speaker’s x-vector from
the input signal. Step 2 (X-vector anonymization) anonymizes
this x-vector using an external pool of speakers. Step 3 (Speech
synthesis) synthesizes a speech waveform from the anonymized
x-vector and the original BN and F0 features using an acoustic
model (AM) and the NSF model.
Figure 1: General anonymization scheme.
Step 2 (yellow box in Fig. 1) is the focus of this paper. It
aims to generate a pseudo-speaker and comprises two sub-steps:
1) select N∗ candidate target x-vectors from the anonymization
pool; 2) average them to obtain the pseudo-speaker x-vector. In
the following, we introduce various design choices for pseudo-
speaker selection. In all cases, a single target pseudo-speaker
x-vector is selected for a given source speaker S, and all the ut-
terances of S are mapped to it, following the perm strategy de-
scribed in [10]. This strategy has been shown to perform robust
anonymization compared to other strategies described in [10].
2.1. Distance Metric: Cosine vs. PLDA
We compare two metrics to identify candidates for target x-
vectors. The first one is the cosine distance, which was used
by [8]. It is defined as
1− u · v||u||2||v||2 (1)
for a pair of x-vectors u and v. The second one is PLDA
[17], which represents the log-likelihood ratio of same-speaker
(Hs) and different-speaker (Hd) hypotheses. PLDA models x-
vectors ω as ω = m+ V y +Dz, where m is the center of the
acoustic space, the columns of V represent speaker variability
(eigenvoices) with y depending only on the speaker, and the
columns of D capture channel variability (eigenchannels) with
z varying from one recording to another. The parameters m, V
and D are trained using x-vectors from the training set for the
x-vector model, which is used to generate the anonymization
pool. The log-likelihood ratio score
PLDA = log
p(ωi, ωj |Hs)
p(ωi, ωj |Hd) (2)
can be computed in closed form [18]. We propose to use minus-
PLDA as the “distance” between a pair of x-vectors.
2.2. Proximity: Random
The simplest candidate x-vector selection strategy called ran-
dom consists of simply selecting N∗ (set to 100) x-vectors uni-
formly at random from the same gender as the source in the
anonymization pool. Note that this strategy does not allow us to
choose particular regions of interest in x-vector space.
2.3. Proximity: Near vs. Far
The notion of distance can be used to define regions in x-vector
space which closely resemble (near) or least resemble (far) the
source speaker S. In essence, we rank all the x-vectors in the
anonymization pool in increasing order of their distance from
S and select either the top N (near) or the bottom N (far). To
introduce some randomness, N∗ < N x-vectors are selected
out of these N uniformly at random. The variability of results
is controlled by a fixed random seed. The values of N and N∗
are fixed to 200 and 100 respectively in our experiments. We
noticed a sharp decline in utility for a smaller value of N∗.
2.4. Proximity: Sparse vs. Dense
A simple mapping to far or near regions might produce biased
pseudo-speaker estimates and the actual region where the out-
put x-vector lies may not be optimal with respect to the distance
from the source speaker. In order to pick the target pseudo-
speaker in a specific region, we identify clusters of x-vectors in
the anonymization pool which are then ranked based on their
density. The density of each cluster is determined by the num-
ber of members belonging to that cluster.
We use Affinity Propagation [19] to determine the number
of clusters and their members in the anonymization pool. Affin-
ity Propagation is a non-parametric clustering method where
the number of clusters is determined automatically through a
message passing protocol. Two parameters determine the final
number of clusters: preference assigns prior weights to samples
which may be likely candidates for centroids, and damping fac-
tor is a floating-point multiplier to responsibility and availabil-
ity messages. In our experiments, equal preference is assigned
to each sample and the damping factor is set to 0.5. Out of 1160
speakers in the anonymization pool, 80 clusters were found, in-
cluding 46 male and 34 female. The number of speakers per
cluster ranges from 6 (sparse) to 36 (dense).
Candidate x-vector selection is achieved by picking either
the 10 clusters with least members (sparse) or the 10 clusters
with most members (dense). The remaining clusters are ig-
nored. During anonymization, one of the 10 clusters is selected
at random and 50% of its members (N∗) are averaged to pro-
duce the pseudo-speaker. The 50% candidate x-vectors for a
given cluster remain fixed for a given random seed.
2.5. Gender-selection: Same, Opposite, or Random
We observe clear clustering of the two genders in x-vector
space using both cosine and PLDA distances. Hence, we pro-
pose gender selection as a design choice to study its impact
on anonymization and intelligibility. We have the gender in-
formation for the source speaker as well as the speakers in the
anonymization pool. Hence this design choice can be combined
with all proximity choices. We study three different types of
gender selection: same where the candidate target x-vectors are
constrained to be of the same gender as the source; opposite
where they are constrained to be of the opposite gender; and
random where the target gender is selected at random before
picking candidate x-vectors of that gender.
3. Experimental setup
3.1. Data
Following the rules of the VoicePrivacy Challenge, we use three
publicly available datasets for our experiments.2 VoxCeleb-1,2
[20, 21] and the train-clean-100 and train-other-500 subsets of
LibriSpeech [22] and LibriTTS [23] are used to train the mod-
els described in Section 2. The development and test sets are
built from LibriSpeech dev-clean and test-clean, respectively.
Details about the number of speakers, utterances, and trials in
the enrollment and trial sets can be found in [1].
3.2. Evaluation methodology
We evaluate the above design choices in terms of privacy
and utility. We define utility as the objective intelligibility of
anonymized speech measured by the Word Error Rate (WER).
The primary metric for privacy is the Equal Error Rate (EER).
3.2.1. Attack model
Privacy protection can be seen as a game between two enti-
ties: a “user” who publishes anonymized speech to hide his/ her
identity, and an “attacker” who attempts to uncover the user’s
identity by conducting speaker verification trials over enrolled
speakers. The attacker may possibly use some knowledge about
the anonymization scheme to transform the enrollment data.
To assess the strength of anonymization against attackers
with increasing amounts of knowledge, we perform the evalu-
ation in three stages. The first scenario (Baseline) refers to the
case when the user does not perform any anonymization before
publication and the attacker also uses non-anonymized speech
for enrollment. This attacker typically achieves low error rate
(i.e., the user identity is accurately predicted) since there is no
anonymization. In the second scenario (Ignorant), the user pub-
lishes anonymized speech, unbeknownst to the attacker who
still uses non-anonymized speech for enrollment. Finally, in
the Semi-Ignorant scenario, both the user and the attacker use
anonymized speech for publication and enrollment respectively.
However the parameters of anonymization used by the attacker
might differ from the user’s parameters.
The final scenario is the one in which the user is most vul-
2The VoicePrivacy Challenge involves development and evaluation
sets built from both LibriSpeech and VCTK. Due to space limitations,
we focus on LibriSpeech here.
nerable, hence it is considered as the lower bound for privacy in
the context of this study. Note that there can be even stronger
attacks [10] when the attacker has the exact knowledge of the
anonymization parameters and uses it to generate large amounts
of training data. This scenario is referred to in [10] as the In-
formed scenario. However it is not very realistic, so we do not
consider it here.
3.2.2. Metrics
In all scenarios, the attacker implements the attack using a pre-
trained x-vector-PLDA based Automatic Speaker Verification
(ASVeval) system. Privacy protection is assessed in terms of the
rate of failure of the attacker, as measured by the EER. The EER
is computed from the distribution of PLDA scores generated by
ASVeval. In addition, a pretrained Automatic Speech Recog-
nition (ASReval) system is used to decode anonymized speech
and compute the WER for utility evaluation. Both evaluation
systems are trained on disjoint data from that used to train the
anonymization system. For more details, see [1].
Although we use Kaldi [24] to implement ASVeval, we do
not use it to compute the EER. Instead we use the PLDA scores
output by ASVeval as inputs to the cllr toolkit3 to compute the
ROCCH-EER [25]. The ROCCH-EER has interesting proper-
ties from the privacy perspective [26]. Its value does not exceed
50% which is considered as the upper-bound for anonymization
since it implies complete overlap between genuine and impos-
tor PLDA score distributions [27]. The higher the ROCCH-EER
and the lower the WER, the better.
4. Experimental results
All the experiments are performed using the publicly available
recipe of the VoicePrivacy Challenge.4 Figure 2 shows the EER
values achieved by the considered anonymization scheme for
different design choices. The corresponding WERs are reported
in Table 1. To qualitatively analyze the effect of anonymization
over the source speakers’ x-vectors, we also compute the aver-
age PLDA distance between original and anonymized x-vectors
over all trial utterances in the test set. Figure 3 shows the aver-
age PLDA distance obtained for different design choices.
3https://gitlab.eurecom.fr/nautsch/cllr
4 https://github.com/Voice-Privacy-Challenge/
Voice-Privacy-Challenge-2020
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Figure 2: ROCCH-EER (%) obtained by ASVeval on the test set by an Ignorant or a Semi-Ignorant attacker for different design choices.
a) Distance: cosine vs. PLDA. Proximity is fixed to far and gender to same. b) Proximity: random, near, far, sparse, or dense. Distance
is fixed to PLDA and gender to same. c) Gender: same, opposite, or random. Distance is fixed to PLDA and proximity to dense.
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Figure 3: Average PLDA distance between original and
anonymized x-vectors for different design choices. Comparison
of: a) Distance with proximity as far and gender as same; b)
Proximity with distance as PLDA and gender as same; c) Gen-
der with distance as PLDA and proximity as dense. (Darker left
bars: male speakers, Lighter right bars: female speakers)
Table 1: WER (%) obtained by ASReval on the dev and test sets.
Distance Proximity Gender-selection
Dev
WER (%)
Test
WER (%)
Baseline (no anonymization) 3.83 4.15
Random 6.28 6.58
Cosine Far
Same
6.50 6.81
PLDA
6.38 6.71
Near 6.42 6.79
Sparse 10.04 10.94
Dense
6.45 6.83
Random 6.86 6.88
Opposite 7.22 7.19
4.1. Distance
Our first experiment aims to identify the distance metric which
is most suitable for the selection of candidate target x-vectors.
To do so, we fix the proximity as far and the gender selection
strategy as same, and we consider cosine distance vs. PLDA.
We observe in Fig. 2(a) that cosine distance and PLDA result
in a comparabley high ROCCH-EER in the Ignorant case but
PLDA consistently outperforms cosine distance (i.e., it results
in a higher ROCCH-EER) in the Semi-Ignorant case. We also
notice in Fig. 3 that the average PLDA distance between origi-
nal and anonymized x-vectors is lower with cosine distance as
compared to PLDA. For these reasons, we use PLDA to mea-
sure distances in x-vector space in the following experiments.
4.2. Proximity
Our second experiment assesses the five choices of target prox-
imity described in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. The distance met-
ric is fixed to PLDA and the gender selection strategy to same.
We observe in Fig. 2(b) that although x-vector selection from
a far region achieves the greatest level of anonymization in the
Ignorant case, it is outperformed by selection from sparse or
dense regions in the Semi-Ignorant case. We notice in Fig. 3
that the target x-vectors are not too far from the source in the
case of sparse or dense when compared to far. This may be due
to the fact that same gender selection allows only same-gender
clusters which lie nearby the source x-vectors. Random target
selection provides similar privacy protection and average PLDA
distance as sparse or dense.
Although random target selection produces comparable pri-
vacy protection and utility to dense, it limits the flexibility to se-
lect different regions in x-vector space. Compared to the sparse
selection strategy, the dense strategy provides slightly better pri-
vacy protection in the Semi-Ignorant case, as well as higher util-
ity (see Table 1). This might be due to fewer members in sparse
clusters, hence a smaller value of N∗ as pointed out in Sec-
tion 2.3. Consequently we select the dense strategy in our third
experiment.
4.3. Gender selection
Our third experiment concerns the gender selection strategy in
Section 2.5. The distance is fixed to PLDA and proximity to
dense. When we look at male trials in Fig. 2(c), it is not clear
which gender selection strategy is the best among same and op-
posite, but female trials show that random strategy outperforms
the rest. We also observe in Fig. 3 that the mean distance is
much higher in the case of random and opposite gender selec-
tion, which is intuitive since it allows selection of dense clusters
from other genders as well. However, we notice that utility suf-
fers in the case of opposite gender selection (see Table 1) due
to limitations of cross-gender voice conversion. Hence we can
conclude that random gender selection is the best choice.
5. Conclusions
We presented a flexible speaker anonymization scheme as the
primary baseline for the first VoicePrivacy Challenge. In par-
ticular we proposed three design choices for target selection in
x-vector space, namely distance metric, proximity, and gender
selection which can be combined to obtain various anonymiza-
tion systems. We objectively evaluated these choices in terms
of ROCCH-EER to measure privacy protection and decoding
WER to measure utility. We also reported the average PLDA
distance between the source and the target. We showed that the
previously used cosine distance is not the best choice of distance
in x-vector space and it should be replaced by PLDA. Then we
explored interesting regions in the x-vector space for picking
the target pseudo-speaker during anonymization. We observed
that when the target is picked in a dense region and the tar-
get gender is selected at random, robust privacy protection can
be achieved against both Ignorant and Semi-Ignorant attackers
with a reasonable loss of utility. In the future, we will evaluate
the best design choices with additional utility metrics, e.g., the
WER obtained after retraining ASReval on anonymized data.
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